Laser Photonics ($LASE): A Fraud Machine With a Nasdaq Ticker
Reports
•
August 31, 2025
Laser Photonics ($LASE): A Fraud Machine With a Nasdaq Ticker
Reports
•
August 31, 2025


How Dmitriy Nikitin, Wayne Tupuola, and ICT Investments Aimed Their Laser at Nasdaq — and Turned LASE Into a Cash Funnel, a Payday Loan Addict, and the Latest Stop in a 25-Year Fraud Cycle.
Laser Photonics Corp. (NASDAQ: LASE) bills itself as a fast-growing industrial laser company with triple-digit growth and expanding gross margins. Management highlights its “organic expansion” into new markets, powered by acquisitions and innovation.
Our investigation shows a very different story: a publicly traded shell controlled by ICT Investments and Dmitriy Nikitin, recycling failed assets into a Nasdaq listing, funneling cash and stock to affiliates, inflating optics through distressed acquisitions, and surviving on predatory loans to cover payroll.
Laser Photonics is not new. It is the latest incarnation in a 25-year pattern of failed ventures — from BlueChip Energy to Advanced Solar Photonics to Fonon Corporation — all of which collapsed into lawsuits, bankruptcies, and allegations of fraud.
Why We’re Short Laser Photonics (NASDAQ: LASE)
Controlled Company, Not Independent — ICT Investments (Dmitriy Nikitin) and affiliates (Fonon Corp, Fonon Technologies) control 58.55% of shares and siphon cash via “services,” distributions, and insider loans.
Insider Enrichment Over Shareholders — Millions in stock and cash flow to ICT/Fonon for payroll, overhead, and IP “licenses” already owned by insiders. Disclosures even mandate distributions back to affiliates.
Distressed Assets Dressed Up as Growth — The October 2024 CMS acquisition came out of Chapter 11 bankruptcy ($1M price tag). Management spun it as “organic growth,” while booking a $3.86M accounting gain and shifting to percentage-of-completion accounting to inflate revenue.
Financial Fragility — Working capital swung from a $5.1M surplus (Dec 2024) to a $3.0M deficit (Jun 2025). Cash fell to just $78,522, forcing reliance on short-term insider loans and payday-style financings.
Predatory Loans & Liquidity Dependence — ICT covered payroll with unsecured loans ($200k, $400k, $20k) carrying flat 10%+ interest due in weeks. A $2M external loan (net $1.9M) requires repayment of >$3M by Feb 2026 — an implied ~100% APR.
Restatements & Reporting Failures — In 2024, management admitted multiple prior reports should not be relied upon. Audit Committee restatements reclassified affiliate payments and revealed material weaknesses in controls.
A Familiar Playbook — Nikitin’s prior ventures (BlueChip Energy, Advanced Solar Photonics, Fonon) all ended in lawsuits, bankruptcies, and shareholder wipeouts. The same governance, related-party structures, and asset shuffling are back with LASE.
We believe LASE is effectively worthless.
Origins and Insider Control
From its inception, Laser Photonics was structured as a controlled company under Nasdaq rules. Control lies with ICT Investments LLC, managed by Dmitriy Nikitin.
As of June 30, 2025, ICT directly owned 4,438,695 shares.
Affiliates controlled by ICT added another 3,935,000 shares:
Fonon Corporation – 3,000,000
Fonon Technologies – 935,000
Total control: 58.55% of outstanding shares.

Figure: This chart of top institutional holders shows that ICT Investments, LLC (31.09%) and Fonon Corporation (28.02%) together control nearly 60% of Laser Photonics’ outstanding shares. Both are affiliated with Dmitriy Nikitin, making LASE a textbook “controlled company.” By contrast, legitimate institutions like Vanguard, BlackRock, and State Street each hold less than 3%. This ownership structure underscores that outside investors have little influence, while insiders dominate governance and capital flows.
This concentration gives Nikitin effective veto power over governance, disclosures, and capital allocation.
Even more telling: LASE disclosed that “any distribution between Laser Photonics and ICT must be distributed to an affiliate company.” This confirms the company’s primary function: routing shareholder resources back to the insider network.
The Fonon Connection
Laser Photonics did not spring up independently. It emerged directly out of Fonon Corporation, another Nikitin vehicle that stopped filing financials after discovering missing tax returns and accumulating large deficits. Instead of addressing those failures, Nikitin pivoted Fonon’s assets and personnel into LASE.
The entanglement continues:
May 21, 2024: LASE issued 3,000,000 common shares (valued at $6.615M) to Fonon for a sublicense to Fonon’s laser processing IP. Management recorded the issuance as a “deemed dividend to an affiliate.”
2024: LASE recorded $5.78M in cash distributions to Fonon, largely to cover payroll and overhead. This followed $1.21M in 2023.
2025 Q2: Recorded unpaid payables of $35,760 for ICT accounting services, $83,073 for ICT management, and $7,907 for Fonon marketing.

Figure: This note from Laser Photonics’ filings shows the company’s deep reliance on ICT Investments and its affiliates (Fonon Technologies, Fonon Corporation). ICT controls 58.55% of shares and provides essential services like accounting and management — billed back to LASE ($35,760 and $83,073 in Q2 2025). LASE also owed $7,907 to Fonon Corporation for marketing. To cover payroll and expenses, LASE borrowed $620,000 in short-term loans from ICT in Q2 2025 and took a $30,000 unsecured advance from Fonon Technologies, repaid the next month. These disclosures confirm that basic operations and liquidity depend on insider financing and services, not independent resources.
This is not arm’s-length governance. It is a closed loop: a public company funneling money back to its controllers.
Dmitriy Nikitin: A Track Record of Failure, Fraud, and Bankruptcies

At the center of Laser Photonics is Dmitriy Nikitin, Managing Partner of ICT Investments and controlling shareholder of LASE. Nikitin is not a new figure in the world of questionable corporate ventures. His name appears repeatedly across a trail of bankruptcies, lawsuits, unpaid debts, and collapsed companies stretching back more than two decades.
BlueChip Energy & Advanced Solar Photonics (ASP)
Before LASE, Nikitin ran BlueChip Energy and its subsidiary Advanced Solar Photonics, both headquartered in Florida. These companies positioned themselves as clean-energy leaders, producing solar panels and operating large solar farms. The reality unraveled quickly:
Customer & lender fraud: Lawsuits alleged that BlueChip Energy sold counterfeit solar panels and misled customers about performance and warranties.
Government subsidies: Investigations revealed the company received subsidies and tax credits while failing to deliver legitimate output.
Bankruptcy: BlueChip collapsed, leaving creditors, customers, and lenders pursuing millions in unpaid claims.

Figure: This excerpt details the downfall of BlueChip Energy LLC, a prior Dmitriy Nikitin venture. Once boasting 200 employees and ~$23M in annual revenue, the company collapsed under more than $16M in debt, lawsuits, and allegations of producing counterfeit solar panels. Assets — including equipment, panels, and office furniture — were liquidated to repay creditors, with a $2.5M SunTrust claim prioritized. The collapse underscores the recurring pattern in Nikitin-led companies: ambitious promises, rapid expansion, followed by debt, lawsuits, and investor losses.
BlueChip’s solar assets were ultimately sold off at bankruptcy auction for $160,000. They resurfaced in later transactions tied to Nikitin’s next company, Fonon. READ HERE
Fonon Corporation (OTC: FNON)
After BlueChip’s collapse, Nikitin pivoted into Fonon Corporation, an “industrial laser” company. Fonon quickly showed the same warning signs now present at Laser Photonics:
Shell activity: Fonon engaged in dubious related-party transactions, including issuing shares to affiliates in exchange for distressed or nearly worthless assets.
Fraudulent transfer: One of the most egregious deals was Fonon’s $5 million share issuance to purchase a solar farm. That farm had just been acquired out of the BlueChip bankruptcy auction for only $160,000 — a direct value transfer from public investors to an insider-linked entity.
Financial opacity: Fonon ceased filing financials, citing missing tax returns and large accumulated deficits.
Insider overlap: Nikitin associates and family members occupied management roles across Fonon, ICT, and affiliated entities.

Figure: This court document comes from the U.S. District Court, Middle District of Florida (Case No. 6:13-cv-657-JA-KRS), where SunTrust Equipment Finance sued a web of entities tied to Dmitriy Nikitin. Defendants included BlueChip Power, Advanced Solar Photonics, ICT Investments, US Investment Corporation, Laser Photonics, Dmitriy Nikitin and his wife, Svetlana Nikitin, and others. The case appointed Michael Moecker as Receiver, leading to the July 2013 auction of assets at the Lake Mary facility. This filing underscores the continuity between Nikitin’s failed ventures (BlueChip/ASP) and the later Laser Photonics — all part of the same insider-controlled network now recycled into LASE. READ HERE

Figure: This chart shows the trading history of Fonon Corporation (OTC: FNON), another Dmitriy Nikitin-controlled venture. After brief speculative spikes in 2015–2016, the stock collapsed, drifting toward zero by 2018 and ultimately becoming inactive. Fonon stopped filing financials, citing missing tax returns and deficits, leaving shareholders with heavy losses. The trajectory illustrates the recurring pattern of Nikitin ventures: initial hype, insider-driven transactions, collapse of investor value, and eventual abandonment.
Fonon’s stock collapsed, leaving retail shareholders with nothing. The pattern — asset recycling, inflated valuations, insider enrichment, and eventual implosion — is now being repeated at Laser Photonics.
Personal Financial Misconduct
Nikitin’s track record isn’t limited to corporate failures. Court and public records show a history of unpaid debts, liens, and bankruptcy:
Federal Tax Liens: At one point, Nikitin and his wife faced an $81,500 lien for unpaid federal taxes.
Construction lien: Their home was liened by a contractor for non-payment after work was completed on their swimming pool.
Bank of America garnishment: Nikitin’s wages were garnished to collect on unpaid debts.
Property tax delinquency: County tax collectors issued warrants for unpaid property taxes.
Bankruptcy filing: Dmitriy and his wife filed personal bankruptcy to discharge over $10 million in debts, including unpaid loans, judgments, and vendor claims.
In creditor filings, allegations emerged that the Nikitins had concealed assets, including offshore transfers and ownership interests routed through affiliates.
Lifestyle on Investor Money
Despite bankruptcies and unpaid debts, Nikitin has maintained a lavish lifestyle, allegedly funded by investor capital diverted through his companies:
A luxury home in Florida.
Expensive vehicles, including luxury imports.
A yacht purchased at the same time creditors and employees alleged non-payment.
Evidence of discretionary spending while debts remained unresolved.

Figure: This excerpt from the Orlando Business Journal describes how the founder and CEO of Precision Technology Group (PTG) — an earlier Nikitin-linked venture — diverted company funds for personal luxuries. After receiving payments to develop laser technology, he allegedly used the money to buy a $27,000 boat and later a Mercedes SUV to tow it, when his sedan proved unsuitable. Former employees reported such personal spending from company funds was “standard practice” at PTG. This reflects a long-running pattern of insider self-enrichment at the expense of corporate integrity. READ HERE
The contrast between this lifestyle and the trail of collapsed companies and unpaid obligations highlights the pattern of extraction: raise capital, funnel value, leave losses behind.
Regulatory and Legal Scrutiny
Nikitin’s name appears across multiple lawsuits and SEC scrutiny:
BlueChip Energy: subject of lawsuits for fraudulent misrepresentation, counterfeit solar products, and unpaid loans.
Fonon Corp.: linked to shell transactions and dubious asset transfers.
Laser Photonics (LASE): during registration in 2020, the SEC questioned whether the company was effectively a shell, why Nikitin’s involvement was omitted, and why CEO Wayne Tupuola’s Fonon background was excluded.

Figure: This document shows the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) issuing a formal comment letter to Wayne Tupuola, President of Laser Photonics, regarding the company’s Form 10-12G registration statement filed April 30, 2020 (File No. 000-56166).
The SEC informed Laser Photonics that it had reviewed the filing and identified disclosure issues requiring clarification, including potential shell-company status, omitted details on executive roles, and undisclosed prior affiliations. The letter required Laser Photonics to respond within 10 business days, underscoring early regulatory concerns about the company’s transparency and governance even before it entered the public markets. READ HERE
The SEC’s early concerns proved prescient. Today, LASE disclosures confirm that insiders continue to occupy overlapping roles, that cash and stock flow to affiliated entities, and that governance is controlled by ICT and Nikitin.
The Pattern Repeats
The through-line across Nikitin’s ventures is unmistakable:
Form a flashy “growth” company in a hot sector (solar, lasers).
Raise capital or go public via reverse merger or IPO.
Route cash, stock, and contracts to affiliates and insider entities.
Acquire distressed assets and inflate results through accounting gimmicks.
Collapse under debt, lawsuits, and regulatory pressure.
Every time, outside investors lose; insiders walk away with assets or payouts.
Laser Photonics is simply the latest chapter in this cycle.
Insider Roles and Conflicts
Leadership overlaps reinforce the conflict.
Wayne Tupuola, CEO of LASE, has been listed as Vice President of Operations at ICT Investments and as a manager at Fonon Technologies. That places him on both sides of insider transactions — as CEO of LASE and as an executive at its affiliates.
ICT and Fonon provide LASE with accounting, marketing, and compliance services. These basic corporate functions are outsourced to — and billed back by — the controlling shareholder.
Disclosures show advisory fees paid directly to Dmitriy Nikitin for SEC filings, cementing the overlap.

Figure: CEO Wayne Tupuola Mugshot (2004 Arrest Record)
Public records confirm that Tupuola was arrested in 2004. While decades old, the record raises additional questions about the credibility of leadership at a company already entangled in governance conflicts.
Manufactured Growth Through Distressed Assets
The growth story centers on the October 2024 acquisition of Control Micro Systems (CMS).
CMS filed Chapter 11 bankruptcy in May 2024 in the Middle District of Florida.
On October 31, 2024, LASE acquired CMS’s assets through a court-approved sale for ~$950,000 in cash and ~$100,000 in stock.
Accounting treatment: LASE booked a $3.86M bargain-purchase gain in 2024.
This gain was not revenue. It was an accounting entry — but it allowed LASE to frame 2024 as a turnaround year.
Post-acquisition, LASE adopted percentage-of-completion (POC) accounting for CMS-style custom builds, enabling the company to pull revenue recognition forward.

Figure: This image captures Laser Photonics CFO Carlos Sardinas during an August 27, 2025 paid interview with New to The Street TV. Sardinas repeats claims of “300% year-over-year growth” and “53% gross margins,” attributing results to “organic clean tech growth” and the acquisition of Control Micro Systems. However, his delivery — visibly uneasy, stumbling over words, and projecting an over-rehearsed narrative — reinforces concerns of credibility gaps and selective disclosure. The setting, a promotional broadcast rather than an independent interview, underscores the reliance on media spin over fundamentals. We recommend watching HERE
When CFO Carlos Sardinas appeared on New to The Street TV on August 27, 2025, he cited “~300% YoY growth and ~53% gross margins.” These numbers matched LASE’s Q2 2025 press points but masked reality:
CMS was bankrupt, not a growth engine.
The backlog was inherited.
POC accounting created temporary spikes.
The TV segment was part of a paid media contract announced August 14, 2025.

Figure: CMS Bankruptcy Filing
Court records (Case 6:24-bk-02727-LVV) confirm CMS filed for Chapter 11 on May 30, 2024. The creditors’ meeting was held June 27, 2024, and claims were due August 8, 2024.
Breaking Balance Sheet
The financials show rapid deterioration:
2023: Revenue $3.939M; gross margin 73.6%; net loss $(3.75)M.
2024: Revenue $3.415M (–13%); gross margin collapsed to 43.4%; operating loss $(6.46)M; net loss $(2.52)M (flattered by CMS gain).
Q1 2025: Revenue $2.29M (+208% YoY), driven by CMS backlog and POC.
Q2 2025: Revenue $2.6M (+317% YoY); gross margin 53.5%.
Liquidity collapse:
Dec 31, 2024: Cash $534k; working capital +$5.08M.
Jun 30, 2025: Cash $78,522; working capital –$2.996M.
In six months, working capital swung –$8M.
Lifeline: Insider and Predatory Loans
To survive, LASE relies on insiders and high-cost financings.
Apr–Jun 2025 ICT Loans: $200k, $400k, and $20k to cover payroll, each with flat 10% interest due within weeks. Balance owed: $620k.
Jun 27, 2025 Fonon Advance: $30k, repayable on demand.
External financing:
Feb 2025: $2M loan (net $1.9M after $100k fee), repayable at >$3M by Feb 2026. Effective APR ~100%.
Additional Agile Capital loans in 2025 carried weekly repayments of $54k–$72k and upfront fees.

Figure: Insider Loans From ICT Investments
This filing shows Laser Photonics’ reliance on ICT Investments, its controlling shareholder, for basic liquidity. In Q2 2025, the company borrowed $200,000 (April 3), $400,000 (April 16), and $20,000 (June 20) — all short-term, unsecured loans carrying fixed interest charges of $20k, $40k, and $2k respectively. By June 30, 2025, the balance due was $620,000. On June 27, Fonon Technologies also provided a $30,000 temporary advance, repaid the following month. These repeated insider loans highlight that Laser Photonics is dependent on its controlling affiliate for routine expenses like payroll, raising questions about independence and financial stability.
Reporting Risk
Credibility is further undermined by reporting failures:
2024 restatement of 2023 financials after overstating deferred revenue and cost of sales.
Management admitted that “multiple prior reports should not be relied upon.”

Figure: In 2024, Laser Photonics announced that its previously issued financial statements for the first and second quarters of 2024 “should no longer be relied upon.” The Audit Committee determined restatements were required after identifying errors and non-compliance with SEC rules. Specifically, the company:
Filed amended reports in May 2024 after initial filings lacked auditor review.
Was deemed non-compliant under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 until corrected.
Filed a second amendment in September 2024, reclassifying sales and marketing costs paid to affiliate Fonon Corporation — shifting them from operating expenses to equity distributions.
These restatements and disclosures highlight material weaknesses in internal control and further undermine the credibility of Laser Photonics’ reporting.
For a company public less than two years, this signals material weaknesses in internal control and an unreliable reporting culture.
Legal & Market Pressure
The cracks are visible:
Oct 1, 2024: LASE stock fell >40% intraday after restatement and fraud concerns.
Shareholder lawsuits: Pomerantz, Block & Leviton, Portnoy, and Schall Law Firms opened investigations into misrepresentation.
SEC questions (2020): raised concerns about shell status, Nikitin’s undisclosed role, and Tupuola’s omitted Fonon ties.
Paid promotions (2025): highlight reliance on spin, not fundamentals.

Figure: On October 1, 2024, Laser Photonics’ stock (NASDAQ: LASE) experienced a dramatic intraday collapse, plunging more than 40% following revelations of restated financials and insider-related controversies. The chart shows the stock spiking above $18 in late September before crashing sharply back below $8 in a matter of days.
This volatility illustrates how quickly investor confidence evaporated once governance and reporting failures came to light — a hallmark of structurally weak, promotion-driven companies.
Conclusion: A Familiar Playbook
The pattern is unmistakable:
Insider control by ICT and affiliates.
Millions transferred via shares, distributions, fees, and loans.
Distressed acquisitions rebranded as “growth.”
Predatory financings keeping the lights on.
Unreliable reporting and legal pressure.
This is not a growth company. It is a controlled entity designed to enrich insiders.
We believe Laser Photonics is effectively worthless. Shareholders face the same outcome as every prior Nikitin venture: insiders walking away enriched, investors left with nothing.
Disclaimer
BMF Capital is short Laser Photonics Corp. (NASDAQ: LASE) at $5.67. We will profit if the stock price declines. That isn’t a conflict of interest — that’s the business model.
This report is built entirely on public information: SEC filings, court documents, bankruptcy records, corporate disclosures, and open-source research. We don’t make things up — the numbers, lawsuits, and history speak for themselves. This is not intended to be used as financial advice. For informational purposes only.
For this article, we deliberately tested a different tone: a fact-forward, investigative style with fewer fireworks, to see how media and market participants respond. Normally, BMF Reports is unapologetically blunt, hyper-direct, and willing to call out fraud for what it is — but we can switch gears when needed. If this “straighter” delivery doesn’t resonate, we’ll return to our trademark sharp-edged commentary.
At the end of the day, nothing changes our view: $LASE is a shit fucking company. A controlled-entity cash funnel masquerading as growth. Investors deserve to see it for what it is.
Laser Photonics Corp. (NASDAQ: LASE) bills itself as a fast-growing industrial laser company with triple-digit growth and expanding gross margins. Management highlights its “organic expansion” into new markets, powered by acquisitions and innovation.
Our investigation shows a very different story: a publicly traded shell controlled by ICT Investments and Dmitriy Nikitin, recycling failed assets into a Nasdaq listing, funneling cash and stock to affiliates, inflating optics through distressed acquisitions, and surviving on predatory loans to cover payroll.
Laser Photonics is not new. It is the latest incarnation in a 25-year pattern of failed ventures — from BlueChip Energy to Advanced Solar Photonics to Fonon Corporation — all of which collapsed into lawsuits, bankruptcies, and allegations of fraud.
Why We’re Short Laser Photonics (NASDAQ: LASE)
Controlled Company, Not Independent — ICT Investments (Dmitriy Nikitin) and affiliates (Fonon Corp, Fonon Technologies) control 58.55% of shares and siphon cash via “services,” distributions, and insider loans.
Insider Enrichment Over Shareholders — Millions in stock and cash flow to ICT/Fonon for payroll, overhead, and IP “licenses” already owned by insiders. Disclosures even mandate distributions back to affiliates.
Distressed Assets Dressed Up as Growth — The October 2024 CMS acquisition came out of Chapter 11 bankruptcy ($1M price tag). Management spun it as “organic growth,” while booking a $3.86M accounting gain and shifting to percentage-of-completion accounting to inflate revenue.
Financial Fragility — Working capital swung from a $5.1M surplus (Dec 2024) to a $3.0M deficit (Jun 2025). Cash fell to just $78,522, forcing reliance on short-term insider loans and payday-style financings.
Predatory Loans & Liquidity Dependence — ICT covered payroll with unsecured loans ($200k, $400k, $20k) carrying flat 10%+ interest due in weeks. A $2M external loan (net $1.9M) requires repayment of >$3M by Feb 2026 — an implied ~100% APR.
Restatements & Reporting Failures — In 2024, management admitted multiple prior reports should not be relied upon. Audit Committee restatements reclassified affiliate payments and revealed material weaknesses in controls.
A Familiar Playbook — Nikitin’s prior ventures (BlueChip Energy, Advanced Solar Photonics, Fonon) all ended in lawsuits, bankruptcies, and shareholder wipeouts. The same governance, related-party structures, and asset shuffling are back with LASE.
We believe LASE is effectively worthless.
Origins and Insider Control
From its inception, Laser Photonics was structured as a controlled company under Nasdaq rules. Control lies with ICT Investments LLC, managed by Dmitriy Nikitin.
As of June 30, 2025, ICT directly owned 4,438,695 shares.
Affiliates controlled by ICT added another 3,935,000 shares:
Fonon Corporation – 3,000,000
Fonon Technologies – 935,000
Total control: 58.55% of outstanding shares.

Figure: This chart of top institutional holders shows that ICT Investments, LLC (31.09%) and Fonon Corporation (28.02%) together control nearly 60% of Laser Photonics’ outstanding shares. Both are affiliated with Dmitriy Nikitin, making LASE a textbook “controlled company.” By contrast, legitimate institutions like Vanguard, BlackRock, and State Street each hold less than 3%. This ownership structure underscores that outside investors have little influence, while insiders dominate governance and capital flows.
This concentration gives Nikitin effective veto power over governance, disclosures, and capital allocation.
Even more telling: LASE disclosed that “any distribution between Laser Photonics and ICT must be distributed to an affiliate company.” This confirms the company’s primary function: routing shareholder resources back to the insider network.
The Fonon Connection
Laser Photonics did not spring up independently. It emerged directly out of Fonon Corporation, another Nikitin vehicle that stopped filing financials after discovering missing tax returns and accumulating large deficits. Instead of addressing those failures, Nikitin pivoted Fonon’s assets and personnel into LASE.
The entanglement continues:
May 21, 2024: LASE issued 3,000,000 common shares (valued at $6.615M) to Fonon for a sublicense to Fonon’s laser processing IP. Management recorded the issuance as a “deemed dividend to an affiliate.”
2024: LASE recorded $5.78M in cash distributions to Fonon, largely to cover payroll and overhead. This followed $1.21M in 2023.
2025 Q2: Recorded unpaid payables of $35,760 for ICT accounting services, $83,073 for ICT management, and $7,907 for Fonon marketing.

Figure: This note from Laser Photonics’ filings shows the company’s deep reliance on ICT Investments and its affiliates (Fonon Technologies, Fonon Corporation). ICT controls 58.55% of shares and provides essential services like accounting and management — billed back to LASE ($35,760 and $83,073 in Q2 2025). LASE also owed $7,907 to Fonon Corporation for marketing. To cover payroll and expenses, LASE borrowed $620,000 in short-term loans from ICT in Q2 2025 and took a $30,000 unsecured advance from Fonon Technologies, repaid the next month. These disclosures confirm that basic operations and liquidity depend on insider financing and services, not independent resources.
This is not arm’s-length governance. It is a closed loop: a public company funneling money back to its controllers.
Dmitriy Nikitin: A Track Record of Failure, Fraud, and Bankruptcies

At the center of Laser Photonics is Dmitriy Nikitin, Managing Partner of ICT Investments and controlling shareholder of LASE. Nikitin is not a new figure in the world of questionable corporate ventures. His name appears repeatedly across a trail of bankruptcies, lawsuits, unpaid debts, and collapsed companies stretching back more than two decades.
BlueChip Energy & Advanced Solar Photonics (ASP)
Before LASE, Nikitin ran BlueChip Energy and its subsidiary Advanced Solar Photonics, both headquartered in Florida. These companies positioned themselves as clean-energy leaders, producing solar panels and operating large solar farms. The reality unraveled quickly:
Customer & lender fraud: Lawsuits alleged that BlueChip Energy sold counterfeit solar panels and misled customers about performance and warranties.
Government subsidies: Investigations revealed the company received subsidies and tax credits while failing to deliver legitimate output.
Bankruptcy: BlueChip collapsed, leaving creditors, customers, and lenders pursuing millions in unpaid claims.

Figure: This excerpt details the downfall of BlueChip Energy LLC, a prior Dmitriy Nikitin venture. Once boasting 200 employees and ~$23M in annual revenue, the company collapsed under more than $16M in debt, lawsuits, and allegations of producing counterfeit solar panels. Assets — including equipment, panels, and office furniture — were liquidated to repay creditors, with a $2.5M SunTrust claim prioritized. The collapse underscores the recurring pattern in Nikitin-led companies: ambitious promises, rapid expansion, followed by debt, lawsuits, and investor losses.
BlueChip’s solar assets were ultimately sold off at bankruptcy auction for $160,000. They resurfaced in later transactions tied to Nikitin’s next company, Fonon. READ HERE
Fonon Corporation (OTC: FNON)
After BlueChip’s collapse, Nikitin pivoted into Fonon Corporation, an “industrial laser” company. Fonon quickly showed the same warning signs now present at Laser Photonics:
Shell activity: Fonon engaged in dubious related-party transactions, including issuing shares to affiliates in exchange for distressed or nearly worthless assets.
Fraudulent transfer: One of the most egregious deals was Fonon’s $5 million share issuance to purchase a solar farm. That farm had just been acquired out of the BlueChip bankruptcy auction for only $160,000 — a direct value transfer from public investors to an insider-linked entity.
Financial opacity: Fonon ceased filing financials, citing missing tax returns and large accumulated deficits.
Insider overlap: Nikitin associates and family members occupied management roles across Fonon, ICT, and affiliated entities.

Figure: This court document comes from the U.S. District Court, Middle District of Florida (Case No. 6:13-cv-657-JA-KRS), where SunTrust Equipment Finance sued a web of entities tied to Dmitriy Nikitin. Defendants included BlueChip Power, Advanced Solar Photonics, ICT Investments, US Investment Corporation, Laser Photonics, Dmitriy Nikitin and his wife, Svetlana Nikitin, and others. The case appointed Michael Moecker as Receiver, leading to the July 2013 auction of assets at the Lake Mary facility. This filing underscores the continuity between Nikitin’s failed ventures (BlueChip/ASP) and the later Laser Photonics — all part of the same insider-controlled network now recycled into LASE. READ HERE

Figure: This chart shows the trading history of Fonon Corporation (OTC: FNON), another Dmitriy Nikitin-controlled venture. After brief speculative spikes in 2015–2016, the stock collapsed, drifting toward zero by 2018 and ultimately becoming inactive. Fonon stopped filing financials, citing missing tax returns and deficits, leaving shareholders with heavy losses. The trajectory illustrates the recurring pattern of Nikitin ventures: initial hype, insider-driven transactions, collapse of investor value, and eventual abandonment.
Fonon’s stock collapsed, leaving retail shareholders with nothing. The pattern — asset recycling, inflated valuations, insider enrichment, and eventual implosion — is now being repeated at Laser Photonics.
Personal Financial Misconduct
Nikitin’s track record isn’t limited to corporate failures. Court and public records show a history of unpaid debts, liens, and bankruptcy:
Federal Tax Liens: At one point, Nikitin and his wife faced an $81,500 lien for unpaid federal taxes.
Construction lien: Their home was liened by a contractor for non-payment after work was completed on their swimming pool.
Bank of America garnishment: Nikitin’s wages were garnished to collect on unpaid debts.
Property tax delinquency: County tax collectors issued warrants for unpaid property taxes.
Bankruptcy filing: Dmitriy and his wife filed personal bankruptcy to discharge over $10 million in debts, including unpaid loans, judgments, and vendor claims.
In creditor filings, allegations emerged that the Nikitins had concealed assets, including offshore transfers and ownership interests routed through affiliates.
Lifestyle on Investor Money
Despite bankruptcies and unpaid debts, Nikitin has maintained a lavish lifestyle, allegedly funded by investor capital diverted through his companies:
A luxury home in Florida.
Expensive vehicles, including luxury imports.
A yacht purchased at the same time creditors and employees alleged non-payment.
Evidence of discretionary spending while debts remained unresolved.

Figure: This excerpt from the Orlando Business Journal describes how the founder and CEO of Precision Technology Group (PTG) — an earlier Nikitin-linked venture — diverted company funds for personal luxuries. After receiving payments to develop laser technology, he allegedly used the money to buy a $27,000 boat and later a Mercedes SUV to tow it, when his sedan proved unsuitable. Former employees reported such personal spending from company funds was “standard practice” at PTG. This reflects a long-running pattern of insider self-enrichment at the expense of corporate integrity. READ HERE
The contrast between this lifestyle and the trail of collapsed companies and unpaid obligations highlights the pattern of extraction: raise capital, funnel value, leave losses behind.
Regulatory and Legal Scrutiny
Nikitin’s name appears across multiple lawsuits and SEC scrutiny:
BlueChip Energy: subject of lawsuits for fraudulent misrepresentation, counterfeit solar products, and unpaid loans.
Fonon Corp.: linked to shell transactions and dubious asset transfers.
Laser Photonics (LASE): during registration in 2020, the SEC questioned whether the company was effectively a shell, why Nikitin’s involvement was omitted, and why CEO Wayne Tupuola’s Fonon background was excluded.

Figure: This document shows the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) issuing a formal comment letter to Wayne Tupuola, President of Laser Photonics, regarding the company’s Form 10-12G registration statement filed April 30, 2020 (File No. 000-56166).
The SEC informed Laser Photonics that it had reviewed the filing and identified disclosure issues requiring clarification, including potential shell-company status, omitted details on executive roles, and undisclosed prior affiliations. The letter required Laser Photonics to respond within 10 business days, underscoring early regulatory concerns about the company’s transparency and governance even before it entered the public markets. READ HERE
The SEC’s early concerns proved prescient. Today, LASE disclosures confirm that insiders continue to occupy overlapping roles, that cash and stock flow to affiliated entities, and that governance is controlled by ICT and Nikitin.
The Pattern Repeats
The through-line across Nikitin’s ventures is unmistakable:
Form a flashy “growth” company in a hot sector (solar, lasers).
Raise capital or go public via reverse merger or IPO.
Route cash, stock, and contracts to affiliates and insider entities.
Acquire distressed assets and inflate results through accounting gimmicks.
Collapse under debt, lawsuits, and regulatory pressure.
Every time, outside investors lose; insiders walk away with assets or payouts.
Laser Photonics is simply the latest chapter in this cycle.
Insider Roles and Conflicts
Leadership overlaps reinforce the conflict.
Wayne Tupuola, CEO of LASE, has been listed as Vice President of Operations at ICT Investments and as a manager at Fonon Technologies. That places him on both sides of insider transactions — as CEO of LASE and as an executive at its affiliates.
ICT and Fonon provide LASE with accounting, marketing, and compliance services. These basic corporate functions are outsourced to — and billed back by — the controlling shareholder.
Disclosures show advisory fees paid directly to Dmitriy Nikitin for SEC filings, cementing the overlap.

Figure: CEO Wayne Tupuola Mugshot (2004 Arrest Record)
Public records confirm that Tupuola was arrested in 2004. While decades old, the record raises additional questions about the credibility of leadership at a company already entangled in governance conflicts.
Manufactured Growth Through Distressed Assets
The growth story centers on the October 2024 acquisition of Control Micro Systems (CMS).
CMS filed Chapter 11 bankruptcy in May 2024 in the Middle District of Florida.
On October 31, 2024, LASE acquired CMS’s assets through a court-approved sale for ~$950,000 in cash and ~$100,000 in stock.
Accounting treatment: LASE booked a $3.86M bargain-purchase gain in 2024.
This gain was not revenue. It was an accounting entry — but it allowed LASE to frame 2024 as a turnaround year.
Post-acquisition, LASE adopted percentage-of-completion (POC) accounting for CMS-style custom builds, enabling the company to pull revenue recognition forward.

Figure: This image captures Laser Photonics CFO Carlos Sardinas during an August 27, 2025 paid interview with New to The Street TV. Sardinas repeats claims of “300% year-over-year growth” and “53% gross margins,” attributing results to “organic clean tech growth” and the acquisition of Control Micro Systems. However, his delivery — visibly uneasy, stumbling over words, and projecting an over-rehearsed narrative — reinforces concerns of credibility gaps and selective disclosure. The setting, a promotional broadcast rather than an independent interview, underscores the reliance on media spin over fundamentals. We recommend watching HERE
When CFO Carlos Sardinas appeared on New to The Street TV on August 27, 2025, he cited “~300% YoY growth and ~53% gross margins.” These numbers matched LASE’s Q2 2025 press points but masked reality:
CMS was bankrupt, not a growth engine.
The backlog was inherited.
POC accounting created temporary spikes.
The TV segment was part of a paid media contract announced August 14, 2025.

Figure: CMS Bankruptcy Filing
Court records (Case 6:24-bk-02727-LVV) confirm CMS filed for Chapter 11 on May 30, 2024. The creditors’ meeting was held June 27, 2024, and claims were due August 8, 2024.
Breaking Balance Sheet
The financials show rapid deterioration:
2023: Revenue $3.939M; gross margin 73.6%; net loss $(3.75)M.
2024: Revenue $3.415M (–13%); gross margin collapsed to 43.4%; operating loss $(6.46)M; net loss $(2.52)M (flattered by CMS gain).
Q1 2025: Revenue $2.29M (+208% YoY), driven by CMS backlog and POC.
Q2 2025: Revenue $2.6M (+317% YoY); gross margin 53.5%.
Liquidity collapse:
Dec 31, 2024: Cash $534k; working capital +$5.08M.
Jun 30, 2025: Cash $78,522; working capital –$2.996M.
In six months, working capital swung –$8M.
Lifeline: Insider and Predatory Loans
To survive, LASE relies on insiders and high-cost financings.
Apr–Jun 2025 ICT Loans: $200k, $400k, and $20k to cover payroll, each with flat 10% interest due within weeks. Balance owed: $620k.
Jun 27, 2025 Fonon Advance: $30k, repayable on demand.
External financing:
Feb 2025: $2M loan (net $1.9M after $100k fee), repayable at >$3M by Feb 2026. Effective APR ~100%.
Additional Agile Capital loans in 2025 carried weekly repayments of $54k–$72k and upfront fees.

Figure: Insider Loans From ICT Investments
This filing shows Laser Photonics’ reliance on ICT Investments, its controlling shareholder, for basic liquidity. In Q2 2025, the company borrowed $200,000 (April 3), $400,000 (April 16), and $20,000 (June 20) — all short-term, unsecured loans carrying fixed interest charges of $20k, $40k, and $2k respectively. By June 30, 2025, the balance due was $620,000. On June 27, Fonon Technologies also provided a $30,000 temporary advance, repaid the following month. These repeated insider loans highlight that Laser Photonics is dependent on its controlling affiliate for routine expenses like payroll, raising questions about independence and financial stability.
Reporting Risk
Credibility is further undermined by reporting failures:
2024 restatement of 2023 financials after overstating deferred revenue and cost of sales.
Management admitted that “multiple prior reports should not be relied upon.”

Figure: In 2024, Laser Photonics announced that its previously issued financial statements for the first and second quarters of 2024 “should no longer be relied upon.” The Audit Committee determined restatements were required after identifying errors and non-compliance with SEC rules. Specifically, the company:
Filed amended reports in May 2024 after initial filings lacked auditor review.
Was deemed non-compliant under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 until corrected.
Filed a second amendment in September 2024, reclassifying sales and marketing costs paid to affiliate Fonon Corporation — shifting them from operating expenses to equity distributions.
These restatements and disclosures highlight material weaknesses in internal control and further undermine the credibility of Laser Photonics’ reporting.
For a company public less than two years, this signals material weaknesses in internal control and an unreliable reporting culture.
Legal & Market Pressure
The cracks are visible:
Oct 1, 2024: LASE stock fell >40% intraday after restatement and fraud concerns.
Shareholder lawsuits: Pomerantz, Block & Leviton, Portnoy, and Schall Law Firms opened investigations into misrepresentation.
SEC questions (2020): raised concerns about shell status, Nikitin’s undisclosed role, and Tupuola’s omitted Fonon ties.
Paid promotions (2025): highlight reliance on spin, not fundamentals.

Figure: On October 1, 2024, Laser Photonics’ stock (NASDAQ: LASE) experienced a dramatic intraday collapse, plunging more than 40% following revelations of restated financials and insider-related controversies. The chart shows the stock spiking above $18 in late September before crashing sharply back below $8 in a matter of days.
This volatility illustrates how quickly investor confidence evaporated once governance and reporting failures came to light — a hallmark of structurally weak, promotion-driven companies.
Conclusion: A Familiar Playbook
The pattern is unmistakable:
Insider control by ICT and affiliates.
Millions transferred via shares, distributions, fees, and loans.
Distressed acquisitions rebranded as “growth.”
Predatory financings keeping the lights on.
Unreliable reporting and legal pressure.
This is not a growth company. It is a controlled entity designed to enrich insiders.
We believe Laser Photonics is effectively worthless. Shareholders face the same outcome as every prior Nikitin venture: insiders walking away enriched, investors left with nothing.
Disclaimer
BMF Capital is short Laser Photonics Corp. (NASDAQ: LASE) at $5.67. We will profit if the stock price declines. That isn’t a conflict of interest — that’s the business model.
This report is built entirely on public information: SEC filings, court documents, bankruptcy records, corporate disclosures, and open-source research. We don’t make things up — the numbers, lawsuits, and history speak for themselves. This is not intended to be used as financial advice. For informational purposes only.
For this article, we deliberately tested a different tone: a fact-forward, investigative style with fewer fireworks, to see how media and market participants respond. Normally, BMF Reports is unapologetically blunt, hyper-direct, and willing to call out fraud for what it is — but we can switch gears when needed. If this “straighter” delivery doesn’t resonate, we’ll return to our trademark sharp-edged commentary.
At the end of the day, nothing changes our view: $LASE is a shit fucking company. A controlled-entity cash funnel masquerading as growth. Investors deserve to see it for what it is.
Laser Photonics Corp. (NASDAQ: LASE) bills itself as a fast-growing industrial laser company with triple-digit growth and expanding gross margins. Management highlights its “organic expansion” into new markets, powered by acquisitions and innovation.
Our investigation shows a very different story: a publicly traded shell controlled by ICT Investments and Dmitriy Nikitin, recycling failed assets into a Nasdaq listing, funneling cash and stock to affiliates, inflating optics through distressed acquisitions, and surviving on predatory loans to cover payroll.
Laser Photonics is not new. It is the latest incarnation in a 25-year pattern of failed ventures — from BlueChip Energy to Advanced Solar Photonics to Fonon Corporation — all of which collapsed into lawsuits, bankruptcies, and allegations of fraud.
Why We’re Short Laser Photonics (NASDAQ: LASE)
Controlled Company, Not Independent — ICT Investments (Dmitriy Nikitin) and affiliates (Fonon Corp, Fonon Technologies) control 58.55% of shares and siphon cash via “services,” distributions, and insider loans.
Insider Enrichment Over Shareholders — Millions in stock and cash flow to ICT/Fonon for payroll, overhead, and IP “licenses” already owned by insiders. Disclosures even mandate distributions back to affiliates.
Distressed Assets Dressed Up as Growth — The October 2024 CMS acquisition came out of Chapter 11 bankruptcy ($1M price tag). Management spun it as “organic growth,” while booking a $3.86M accounting gain and shifting to percentage-of-completion accounting to inflate revenue.
Financial Fragility — Working capital swung from a $5.1M surplus (Dec 2024) to a $3.0M deficit (Jun 2025). Cash fell to just $78,522, forcing reliance on short-term insider loans and payday-style financings.
Predatory Loans & Liquidity Dependence — ICT covered payroll with unsecured loans ($200k, $400k, $20k) carrying flat 10%+ interest due in weeks. A $2M external loan (net $1.9M) requires repayment of >$3M by Feb 2026 — an implied ~100% APR.
Restatements & Reporting Failures — In 2024, management admitted multiple prior reports should not be relied upon. Audit Committee restatements reclassified affiliate payments and revealed material weaknesses in controls.
A Familiar Playbook — Nikitin’s prior ventures (BlueChip Energy, Advanced Solar Photonics, Fonon) all ended in lawsuits, bankruptcies, and shareholder wipeouts. The same governance, related-party structures, and asset shuffling are back with LASE.
We believe LASE is effectively worthless.
Origins and Insider Control
From its inception, Laser Photonics was structured as a controlled company under Nasdaq rules. Control lies with ICT Investments LLC, managed by Dmitriy Nikitin.
As of June 30, 2025, ICT directly owned 4,438,695 shares.
Affiliates controlled by ICT added another 3,935,000 shares:
Fonon Corporation – 3,000,000
Fonon Technologies – 935,000
Total control: 58.55% of outstanding shares.

Figure: This chart of top institutional holders shows that ICT Investments, LLC (31.09%) and Fonon Corporation (28.02%) together control nearly 60% of Laser Photonics’ outstanding shares. Both are affiliated with Dmitriy Nikitin, making LASE a textbook “controlled company.” By contrast, legitimate institutions like Vanguard, BlackRock, and State Street each hold less than 3%. This ownership structure underscores that outside investors have little influence, while insiders dominate governance and capital flows.
This concentration gives Nikitin effective veto power over governance, disclosures, and capital allocation.
Even more telling: LASE disclosed that “any distribution between Laser Photonics and ICT must be distributed to an affiliate company.” This confirms the company’s primary function: routing shareholder resources back to the insider network.
The Fonon Connection
Laser Photonics did not spring up independently. It emerged directly out of Fonon Corporation, another Nikitin vehicle that stopped filing financials after discovering missing tax returns and accumulating large deficits. Instead of addressing those failures, Nikitin pivoted Fonon’s assets and personnel into LASE.
The entanglement continues:
May 21, 2024: LASE issued 3,000,000 common shares (valued at $6.615M) to Fonon for a sublicense to Fonon’s laser processing IP. Management recorded the issuance as a “deemed dividend to an affiliate.”
2024: LASE recorded $5.78M in cash distributions to Fonon, largely to cover payroll and overhead. This followed $1.21M in 2023.
2025 Q2: Recorded unpaid payables of $35,760 for ICT accounting services, $83,073 for ICT management, and $7,907 for Fonon marketing.

Figure: This note from Laser Photonics’ filings shows the company’s deep reliance on ICT Investments and its affiliates (Fonon Technologies, Fonon Corporation). ICT controls 58.55% of shares and provides essential services like accounting and management — billed back to LASE ($35,760 and $83,073 in Q2 2025). LASE also owed $7,907 to Fonon Corporation for marketing. To cover payroll and expenses, LASE borrowed $620,000 in short-term loans from ICT in Q2 2025 and took a $30,000 unsecured advance from Fonon Technologies, repaid the next month. These disclosures confirm that basic operations and liquidity depend on insider financing and services, not independent resources.
This is not arm’s-length governance. It is a closed loop: a public company funneling money back to its controllers.
Dmitriy Nikitin: A Track Record of Failure, Fraud, and Bankruptcies

At the center of Laser Photonics is Dmitriy Nikitin, Managing Partner of ICT Investments and controlling shareholder of LASE. Nikitin is not a new figure in the world of questionable corporate ventures. His name appears repeatedly across a trail of bankruptcies, lawsuits, unpaid debts, and collapsed companies stretching back more than two decades.
BlueChip Energy & Advanced Solar Photonics (ASP)
Before LASE, Nikitin ran BlueChip Energy and its subsidiary Advanced Solar Photonics, both headquartered in Florida. These companies positioned themselves as clean-energy leaders, producing solar panels and operating large solar farms. The reality unraveled quickly:
Customer & lender fraud: Lawsuits alleged that BlueChip Energy sold counterfeit solar panels and misled customers about performance and warranties.
Government subsidies: Investigations revealed the company received subsidies and tax credits while failing to deliver legitimate output.
Bankruptcy: BlueChip collapsed, leaving creditors, customers, and lenders pursuing millions in unpaid claims.

Figure: This excerpt details the downfall of BlueChip Energy LLC, a prior Dmitriy Nikitin venture. Once boasting 200 employees and ~$23M in annual revenue, the company collapsed under more than $16M in debt, lawsuits, and allegations of producing counterfeit solar panels. Assets — including equipment, panels, and office furniture — were liquidated to repay creditors, with a $2.5M SunTrust claim prioritized. The collapse underscores the recurring pattern in Nikitin-led companies: ambitious promises, rapid expansion, followed by debt, lawsuits, and investor losses.
BlueChip’s solar assets were ultimately sold off at bankruptcy auction for $160,000. They resurfaced in later transactions tied to Nikitin’s next company, Fonon. READ HERE
Fonon Corporation (OTC: FNON)
After BlueChip’s collapse, Nikitin pivoted into Fonon Corporation, an “industrial laser” company. Fonon quickly showed the same warning signs now present at Laser Photonics:
Shell activity: Fonon engaged in dubious related-party transactions, including issuing shares to affiliates in exchange for distressed or nearly worthless assets.
Fraudulent transfer: One of the most egregious deals was Fonon’s $5 million share issuance to purchase a solar farm. That farm had just been acquired out of the BlueChip bankruptcy auction for only $160,000 — a direct value transfer from public investors to an insider-linked entity.
Financial opacity: Fonon ceased filing financials, citing missing tax returns and large accumulated deficits.
Insider overlap: Nikitin associates and family members occupied management roles across Fonon, ICT, and affiliated entities.

Figure: This court document comes from the U.S. District Court, Middle District of Florida (Case No. 6:13-cv-657-JA-KRS), where SunTrust Equipment Finance sued a web of entities tied to Dmitriy Nikitin. Defendants included BlueChip Power, Advanced Solar Photonics, ICT Investments, US Investment Corporation, Laser Photonics, Dmitriy Nikitin and his wife, Svetlana Nikitin, and others. The case appointed Michael Moecker as Receiver, leading to the July 2013 auction of assets at the Lake Mary facility. This filing underscores the continuity between Nikitin’s failed ventures (BlueChip/ASP) and the later Laser Photonics — all part of the same insider-controlled network now recycled into LASE. READ HERE

Figure: This chart shows the trading history of Fonon Corporation (OTC: FNON), another Dmitriy Nikitin-controlled venture. After brief speculative spikes in 2015–2016, the stock collapsed, drifting toward zero by 2018 and ultimately becoming inactive. Fonon stopped filing financials, citing missing tax returns and deficits, leaving shareholders with heavy losses. The trajectory illustrates the recurring pattern of Nikitin ventures: initial hype, insider-driven transactions, collapse of investor value, and eventual abandonment.
Fonon’s stock collapsed, leaving retail shareholders with nothing. The pattern — asset recycling, inflated valuations, insider enrichment, and eventual implosion — is now being repeated at Laser Photonics.
Personal Financial Misconduct
Nikitin’s track record isn’t limited to corporate failures. Court and public records show a history of unpaid debts, liens, and bankruptcy:
Federal Tax Liens: At one point, Nikitin and his wife faced an $81,500 lien for unpaid federal taxes.
Construction lien: Their home was liened by a contractor for non-payment after work was completed on their swimming pool.
Bank of America garnishment: Nikitin’s wages were garnished to collect on unpaid debts.
Property tax delinquency: County tax collectors issued warrants for unpaid property taxes.
Bankruptcy filing: Dmitriy and his wife filed personal bankruptcy to discharge over $10 million in debts, including unpaid loans, judgments, and vendor claims.
In creditor filings, allegations emerged that the Nikitins had concealed assets, including offshore transfers and ownership interests routed through affiliates.
Lifestyle on Investor Money
Despite bankruptcies and unpaid debts, Nikitin has maintained a lavish lifestyle, allegedly funded by investor capital diverted through his companies:
A luxury home in Florida.
Expensive vehicles, including luxury imports.
A yacht purchased at the same time creditors and employees alleged non-payment.
Evidence of discretionary spending while debts remained unresolved.

Figure: This excerpt from the Orlando Business Journal describes how the founder and CEO of Precision Technology Group (PTG) — an earlier Nikitin-linked venture — diverted company funds for personal luxuries. After receiving payments to develop laser technology, he allegedly used the money to buy a $27,000 boat and later a Mercedes SUV to tow it, when his sedan proved unsuitable. Former employees reported such personal spending from company funds was “standard practice” at PTG. This reflects a long-running pattern of insider self-enrichment at the expense of corporate integrity. READ HERE
The contrast between this lifestyle and the trail of collapsed companies and unpaid obligations highlights the pattern of extraction: raise capital, funnel value, leave losses behind.
Regulatory and Legal Scrutiny
Nikitin’s name appears across multiple lawsuits and SEC scrutiny:
BlueChip Energy: subject of lawsuits for fraudulent misrepresentation, counterfeit solar products, and unpaid loans.
Fonon Corp.: linked to shell transactions and dubious asset transfers.
Laser Photonics (LASE): during registration in 2020, the SEC questioned whether the company was effectively a shell, why Nikitin’s involvement was omitted, and why CEO Wayne Tupuola’s Fonon background was excluded.

Figure: This document shows the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) issuing a formal comment letter to Wayne Tupuola, President of Laser Photonics, regarding the company’s Form 10-12G registration statement filed April 30, 2020 (File No. 000-56166).
The SEC informed Laser Photonics that it had reviewed the filing and identified disclosure issues requiring clarification, including potential shell-company status, omitted details on executive roles, and undisclosed prior affiliations. The letter required Laser Photonics to respond within 10 business days, underscoring early regulatory concerns about the company’s transparency and governance even before it entered the public markets. READ HERE
The SEC’s early concerns proved prescient. Today, LASE disclosures confirm that insiders continue to occupy overlapping roles, that cash and stock flow to affiliated entities, and that governance is controlled by ICT and Nikitin.
The Pattern Repeats
The through-line across Nikitin’s ventures is unmistakable:
Form a flashy “growth” company in a hot sector (solar, lasers).
Raise capital or go public via reverse merger or IPO.
Route cash, stock, and contracts to affiliates and insider entities.
Acquire distressed assets and inflate results through accounting gimmicks.
Collapse under debt, lawsuits, and regulatory pressure.
Every time, outside investors lose; insiders walk away with assets or payouts.
Laser Photonics is simply the latest chapter in this cycle.
Insider Roles and Conflicts
Leadership overlaps reinforce the conflict.
Wayne Tupuola, CEO of LASE, has been listed as Vice President of Operations at ICT Investments and as a manager at Fonon Technologies. That places him on both sides of insider transactions — as CEO of LASE and as an executive at its affiliates.
ICT and Fonon provide LASE with accounting, marketing, and compliance services. These basic corporate functions are outsourced to — and billed back by — the controlling shareholder.
Disclosures show advisory fees paid directly to Dmitriy Nikitin for SEC filings, cementing the overlap.

Figure: CEO Wayne Tupuola Mugshot (2004 Arrest Record)
Public records confirm that Tupuola was arrested in 2004. While decades old, the record raises additional questions about the credibility of leadership at a company already entangled in governance conflicts.
Manufactured Growth Through Distressed Assets
The growth story centers on the October 2024 acquisition of Control Micro Systems (CMS).
CMS filed Chapter 11 bankruptcy in May 2024 in the Middle District of Florida.
On October 31, 2024, LASE acquired CMS’s assets through a court-approved sale for ~$950,000 in cash and ~$100,000 in stock.
Accounting treatment: LASE booked a $3.86M bargain-purchase gain in 2024.
This gain was not revenue. It was an accounting entry — but it allowed LASE to frame 2024 as a turnaround year.
Post-acquisition, LASE adopted percentage-of-completion (POC) accounting for CMS-style custom builds, enabling the company to pull revenue recognition forward.

Figure: This image captures Laser Photonics CFO Carlos Sardinas during an August 27, 2025 paid interview with New to The Street TV. Sardinas repeats claims of “300% year-over-year growth” and “53% gross margins,” attributing results to “organic clean tech growth” and the acquisition of Control Micro Systems. However, his delivery — visibly uneasy, stumbling over words, and projecting an over-rehearsed narrative — reinforces concerns of credibility gaps and selective disclosure. The setting, a promotional broadcast rather than an independent interview, underscores the reliance on media spin over fundamentals. We recommend watching HERE
When CFO Carlos Sardinas appeared on New to The Street TV on August 27, 2025, he cited “~300% YoY growth and ~53% gross margins.” These numbers matched LASE’s Q2 2025 press points but masked reality:
CMS was bankrupt, not a growth engine.
The backlog was inherited.
POC accounting created temporary spikes.
The TV segment was part of a paid media contract announced August 14, 2025.

Figure: CMS Bankruptcy Filing
Court records (Case 6:24-bk-02727-LVV) confirm CMS filed for Chapter 11 on May 30, 2024. The creditors’ meeting was held June 27, 2024, and claims were due August 8, 2024.
Breaking Balance Sheet
The financials show rapid deterioration:
2023: Revenue $3.939M; gross margin 73.6%; net loss $(3.75)M.
2024: Revenue $3.415M (–13%); gross margin collapsed to 43.4%; operating loss $(6.46)M; net loss $(2.52)M (flattered by CMS gain).
Q1 2025: Revenue $2.29M (+208% YoY), driven by CMS backlog and POC.
Q2 2025: Revenue $2.6M (+317% YoY); gross margin 53.5%.
Liquidity collapse:
Dec 31, 2024: Cash $534k; working capital +$5.08M.
Jun 30, 2025: Cash $78,522; working capital –$2.996M.
In six months, working capital swung –$8M.
Lifeline: Insider and Predatory Loans
To survive, LASE relies on insiders and high-cost financings.
Apr–Jun 2025 ICT Loans: $200k, $400k, and $20k to cover payroll, each with flat 10% interest due within weeks. Balance owed: $620k.
Jun 27, 2025 Fonon Advance: $30k, repayable on demand.
External financing:
Feb 2025: $2M loan (net $1.9M after $100k fee), repayable at >$3M by Feb 2026. Effective APR ~100%.
Additional Agile Capital loans in 2025 carried weekly repayments of $54k–$72k and upfront fees.

Figure: Insider Loans From ICT Investments
This filing shows Laser Photonics’ reliance on ICT Investments, its controlling shareholder, for basic liquidity. In Q2 2025, the company borrowed $200,000 (April 3), $400,000 (April 16), and $20,000 (June 20) — all short-term, unsecured loans carrying fixed interest charges of $20k, $40k, and $2k respectively. By June 30, 2025, the balance due was $620,000. On June 27, Fonon Technologies also provided a $30,000 temporary advance, repaid the following month. These repeated insider loans highlight that Laser Photonics is dependent on its controlling affiliate for routine expenses like payroll, raising questions about independence and financial stability.
Reporting Risk
Credibility is further undermined by reporting failures:
2024 restatement of 2023 financials after overstating deferred revenue and cost of sales.
Management admitted that “multiple prior reports should not be relied upon.”

Figure: In 2024, Laser Photonics announced that its previously issued financial statements for the first and second quarters of 2024 “should no longer be relied upon.” The Audit Committee determined restatements were required after identifying errors and non-compliance with SEC rules. Specifically, the company:
Filed amended reports in May 2024 after initial filings lacked auditor review.
Was deemed non-compliant under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 until corrected.
Filed a second amendment in September 2024, reclassifying sales and marketing costs paid to affiliate Fonon Corporation — shifting them from operating expenses to equity distributions.
These restatements and disclosures highlight material weaknesses in internal control and further undermine the credibility of Laser Photonics’ reporting.
For a company public less than two years, this signals material weaknesses in internal control and an unreliable reporting culture.
Legal & Market Pressure
The cracks are visible:
Oct 1, 2024: LASE stock fell >40% intraday after restatement and fraud concerns.
Shareholder lawsuits: Pomerantz, Block & Leviton, Portnoy, and Schall Law Firms opened investigations into misrepresentation.
SEC questions (2020): raised concerns about shell status, Nikitin’s undisclosed role, and Tupuola’s omitted Fonon ties.
Paid promotions (2025): highlight reliance on spin, not fundamentals.

Figure: On October 1, 2024, Laser Photonics’ stock (NASDAQ: LASE) experienced a dramatic intraday collapse, plunging more than 40% following revelations of restated financials and insider-related controversies. The chart shows the stock spiking above $18 in late September before crashing sharply back below $8 in a matter of days.
This volatility illustrates how quickly investor confidence evaporated once governance and reporting failures came to light — a hallmark of structurally weak, promotion-driven companies.
Conclusion: A Familiar Playbook
The pattern is unmistakable:
Insider control by ICT and affiliates.
Millions transferred via shares, distributions, fees, and loans.
Distressed acquisitions rebranded as “growth.”
Predatory financings keeping the lights on.
Unreliable reporting and legal pressure.
This is not a growth company. It is a controlled entity designed to enrich insiders.
We believe Laser Photonics is effectively worthless. Shareholders face the same outcome as every prior Nikitin venture: insiders walking away enriched, investors left with nothing.
Disclaimer
BMF Capital is short Laser Photonics Corp. (NASDAQ: LASE) at $5.67. We will profit if the stock price declines. That isn’t a conflict of interest — that’s the business model.
This report is built entirely on public information: SEC filings, court documents, bankruptcy records, corporate disclosures, and open-source research. We don’t make things up — the numbers, lawsuits, and history speak for themselves. This is not intended to be used as financial advice. For informational purposes only.
For this article, we deliberately tested a different tone: a fact-forward, investigative style with fewer fireworks, to see how media and market participants respond. Normally, BMF Reports is unapologetically blunt, hyper-direct, and willing to call out fraud for what it is — but we can switch gears when needed. If this “straighter” delivery doesn’t resonate, we’ll return to our trademark sharp-edged commentary.
At the end of the day, nothing changes our view: $LASE is a shit fucking company. A controlled-entity cash funnel masquerading as growth. Investors deserve to see it for what it is.
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